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Abstract
The problem of diffusion control on networks has been extensively studied, with appli-
cations ranging from marketing to cybersecurity. However, in many applications, such as
targeted vulnerability assessment or clinical therapies, one aspires to affect a targeted subset
of a network, while limiting the impact on the rest. We present a novel model in which the
principal aim is to optimize graph structure to affect such targeted diffusion. We present an
algorithmic approach for solving this problem at scale, using a gradient-based approach that
leverages Rayleigh quotients and pseudospectrum theory. In addition, we present a condition
for certifying a targeted subgraph as immune to targeted diffusion. Finally, we demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on real and synthetic networks.
1 Introduction
Many diverse phenomena that propagate through a network, such as epidemic spread, cascading
failures, and networks of chemical reactions, can be modeled by network diffusion models [3, 5,
23, 41, 38]. The problem of controlling diffusion has, as a result, received prominent attention
in the literature, with primary focus on two mechanisms for control: the choice of initial nodes
to start the spread [14, 7, 43], and the modification of network structure [16, 32, 42, 33]. To
date, most work on diffusion control (either promotion or inhibition) has considered diffusion
over the entire network. However, in many problems, the focus is instead on diffusion that is
targeted to a particular subset of the network. For example, in cybersecurity, diffusion commonly
models malware spread, but malware attacks are often targeted at particular subsets of critical
devices [12], which should be accounted for in vulnerability analysis. Congestion cascades of
ground traffic or flight networks are other examples, where the goal of resilience may be to ensure
that cascades, should they occur, concentrate on a subset of high-capacity nodes that can handle
them, limiting the impact on the rest of the network [10, 9]. Finally, medical treatments for certain
diseases such as cancer may leverage a molecular signaling network, with the goal of targeting
just the pathogenic portion of it, while limiting the deleterious effects on the rest [39].
We study the problem of targeted diffusion in which a principal1 can modify the graph structure
G = (V, E) to achieve two goals: 1) maximize the diffusion spread to a target subgraph GS ,
and 2) minimize the impact on the remaining graph G \ GS . We capture the first goal by
maximizing a utility function that incorporates spectral information of the adjacency matrix
of G, specifically its largest (in module) eigenvalue, eigenvector centrality, and the normalized
cut of the target subgraph. The second goal is achieved by limiting the modifications made
outside of the target subgraph. We present a scalable algorithmic framework for solving this
∗sixie.yu@wustl.edu
1The principal is the agent who initiates diffusion.
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problem. Our framework leverages a combination of gradient ascent with the use of Rayleigh
quotients and pseudospectrum theory, which yields differentiable approximations of our objective
and allows us to avoid projection steps that would otherwise be costly and imprecise. Moreover,
we derive a condition that enables us to certify if a network is robust against a broad class of
targeted diffusions. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through extensive
experiments.
Related Work: Various dynamical processes can be modeled as diffusion dynamics on networks,
including the spread of infectious diseases [3, 5], cascading failures in infrastructure networks [23,
41], and information spread (e.g., rumors, fake news) on social networks [19, 20]. One line of
research assesses the impact of cascading failures. Yang et al. [41] simulated cascading failures
to quantify the vulnerability of the power grid in North America. Fleurquin et al. [10] studied
the impact of flight delays as a cascading failure diffusing through the network. Motter and Lai
[23] investigated the cascading failures on a network due to the malfunction of a single node.
Another line of research concerns diffusion control, for example, selecting a set of nodes such
that if the diffusion originated from them, it reaches as many nodes as possible [14, 7, 43]; or
modifying network structures to increase or limit some diffusion [32, 28]. However, these lines
of research do not differentiate between targeted and non-targeted nodes. Ho et al. [13] studied
targeted diffusion controlled by changing nodal status. We focus on optimizing underlying network
structures.
Another relevant research thread is network design, which is the problem of modifying network
structure to induce certain desirable outcomes. Some prior work [32, 42, 31] considered the
containment of spreading dynamics by adding or removing nodes or edges from the network, while
others [37, 29, 16, 6, 22, 33] considered limiting the spread of infectious disease by minimizing
the largest eigenvalue of the network. Kempe et al. [15] studied modifying network structure to
induce certain outcomes from a game-theoretic perspective, but they did not consider diffusion
dynamics. Others have studied the problem of manipulating node centrality measures (e.g.,
eigenvector or PageRank centrality) [2, 1] or node similarity measures (e.g., Katz similarity) [44]
through edge perturbation. All of these prior efforts focus on the impact either at the network
level or at the node-level properties, while our focus is on the impact of diffusion dynamics on a
targeted subgraph of the network.
2 Model
We present a model for targeted diffusion through graph structure optimization. We refer to the
agent who initiates diffusion as the principal. We use cybersecurity as a running example, where
the principal (in this case, an attacker or an IT professional performing vulnerability assessment)
initiates the diffusion (e.g., the spread of malware) on a network of computers. We define the
impact of the diffusion as the number of infected (e.g., compromised with malware) nodes. The
principal has two objectives: 1) she wishes to maximize the impact of the diffusion on a targeted
set of nodes (e.g., computing nodes with access to critical assets), and 2) to limit the impact on
non-targeted nodes to ensure stealth [12].
Let G = (V, E) be a connected, undirected, possibly weighted, graph with no self-loops. Let
n = |V| be the number of nodes in G and A be its adjacency matrix. Throughout this paper, the
eigenvalues of A are ranked in descending order λ1(A) ≥ · · · ≥ λn(A). Suppose the principal
targets a subgraph GS where S ⊆ V is the node set of GS . Let S ′ = V \ S, and its induced
subgraph GS′ . Throughout the paper we assume GS is connected, and denote its adjacency
matrix by AS . To achieve her objectives, the principal modifies the structure of G. The modified
2
graph and targeted subgraph are represented by G˜ and G˜S , respectively. Formally, the principal’s
action is to add a perturbation ∆ ∈ Rn×n to A, which results in the perturbed adjacency matrix
A˜ = A+ ∆. The adjacency matrix of G˜S is denoted by A˜S .
2.1 Diffusion Dynamics
The status of a node is modeled by the well-known SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) diffusion
dynamics, where it alternates between “infected” and “susceptible”.2 Due to the malware spread
by infected neighbors, a susceptible node becomes infected with probability β. An infected node
becomes susceptible again (e.g., malware is removed) with probability δ. Following [5], this
process is modeled by a nonlinear dynamical system. Let pii be the probability of node i becoming
infected (e.g., compromised with malware) in the steady state of this dynamical system, with
pi the vector of these probabilities. A key result in [5] is that when λ1(A) < δ/β the system
converges to the steady state pi = 0, which implies that the diffusion process quickly dies out.
However, when λ1(A) ≥ δ/β the system converges to another steady state pi 6= 0. We leverage
this connection between graph structure, dynamical model of epidemic spread, and the epidemic
threshold, in constructing our threat model, as discussed next.
2.2 Threat Model
Maximizing the Impact on GS : To maximize the impact of diffusion on GS , the principal
has two goals: 1) ensure that epidemics starting in GS spread rather than die out, and 2) ensure
that epidemics starting outside GS are likely to reach it. We capture the first goal by maximizing
the largest (in module) eigenvalue of GS , λ1(A˜S), which corresponds to the epidemic threshold
of the targeted subgraph. The second goal is captured by maximizing the normalized cut of
GS , φ(S), where S is the set of nodes in GS and S ′ are the nodes in the remaining graph. The
normalized cut is formally defined as follows:
φ(S) = cut(S,S ′)
(
1
vol(S) +
1
vol(S ′)
)
, (1)
where cut(S,S ′) is the sum of the weights on the edges across S and S ′ (unit weights for
unweighted graphs), and vol(S) (resp. vol(S ′)) is the sum of degrees of the nodes in S (resp. S ′).
The formal rationale for using the normalized cut is based on Meila et al. [21], which showed that
increasing φ(S) increases the probability that a random walker transitions from S ′ to S, if we
assume that GS is smaller than GS′ .
Limiting the Impact on GS′: Another important objective of the principal is to limit the
impact on GS′ , the non-targeted part of the graph. The first way we capture this goal is by
limiting the likelihood of the epidemic spreading to GS′ , which we define as minimizing the impact
I(GS′) =
∑
i∈S′ pii. We now demonstrate that minimizing I(GS′) is approximately equivalent to
minimizing the eigenvector centrality of S ′.
Let P t be the global configuration of the graph at time step t, where P ti is the probability that
node i is infected (e.g., compromised with malware). According to [36] (see Section IV), for
an arbitrary node i, ignoring higher-order terms involving P ti and taking the time step to be
2Our targeted diffusion model generalizes to other common diffusion dynamics such as SIR (Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered) and SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered). See Appendix 1 for a discussion.
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infinitesimally small, the dynamics of P ti is modeled as the following:
dP ti
dt
=
∑
j∈V
βA˜ijP
t
j − δP ti . (2)
Here, we can think of the two terms on the right side as two competing forces. The first term is
the force contributed by the infected neighbors of node i (which increases P ti ), while the second
term is the force due to i’s self recovery (which decreases P ti ). Rewriting in matrix notation
yields:
dP t
dt
=
[
βA˜− δI]P t, (3)
which gives a linear approximation to the non-linear dynamical system proposed in [5]. The
steady state pi must satisfy
[
βA˜ − δI]pi = 0, which is equivalent to A˜pi = (δ/β)pi. Suppose
λ1(A˜) = δ/β, and pi is the corresponding eigenvector. Let v˜1 be the unit eigenvector associated
with λ1(A˜). Let σ(S) =
∑
j∈S v˜1[j] be the eigenvector centrality of S. Noting that pi may differ
from v˜1 by up to a multiplicative constant c, the impact on GS′ can be approximated as:
I(GS′) =
∑
j∈S′
pij ≈ c
∑
j∈S′
v˜1[j] = c
(
1− σ(S)), (4)
where the last equality is because S and S ′ are disjoint and v˜1 is an unit vector. Thus, minimizing
the impact on GS′ is approximately equivalent to maximizing the eigenvector centrality of S.
Recall that to have an epidemic spread, one needs λ1(A˜) ≥ δ/β. Here, we assumed λ1(A˜) = δ/β.
In Section 5, we demonstrate that our analysis yields an approach that is effective even when this
assumption fails to hold (i.e., when λ1(A˜) > δ/β).
The second way in which we limit the impact on the underlying graph is by limiting the impact
of the principal on the spectrum of A.3 Formally, this notion is captured through the following
constraints:
|λi(A˜)− λi(A)| ≤ , i = 1, . . . , n, (5)
where  > 0 can be thought as the principal’s budget.
In summary, the principal aims to (i) maximize the impact on GS through maximizing λ1(A˜S)
while (ii) limiting the impact on GS′ by maximizing the eigenvector centrality σ(S), and satisfying
Eq. (5). Formally, the principal aims to solve the following optimization problem:
max
A˜
α1λ1(A˜S) + α2σ(S) + α3φ(S)
s.t. A˜ ∈ P =
{
A˜
∣∣∣∣∣ |λi(A˜)− λi(A)| ≤ , i = 1, . . . , n,A˜ = A˜>, A˜ii = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
(6)
where the relative importance of the terms is balanced by the nonnegative constants α1, α2, α3,
and the restrictions A˜ = A˜> and A˜ii = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n ensure that A˜ is a valid adjacency
matrix.
3In cybersecurity, there are natural interpretations of an attack’s stealth. See Appendix 2 for further details.
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3 Algorithm
To solve the optimization problem in Eq. (6), a natural approach would be to use a form of
projected gradient ascent. There are, however, two major hurdles to this basic approach: 1) the
objective function involves terms that do not have an explicit functional representation in the
decision variables, and 2) the projection step is quite expensive, as it involves projecting into a
spectral norm ball, which entails an expensive SVD operation [17]. We address these challenges
in Algorithm 1, which is our gradient-based solution to the principal’s optimization problem as
described in Eq. (6).
Algorithm 1 Gradient Ascent Algorithm
1: Input: A, , {ηi}i=1 . {ηi}i=1 is a schedule of step sizes
2: Initialize: i = 1, A˜1 = A, B1 = 0 . Bi: the amount of budget used just before step i
3: while True do
4: Set ∆i to the gradient of α1λ1(A˜S) + α2σ(S) + α3φ(S) w.r.t. to A˜i
5: Set the diagonal entries of ∆i to zeros
6: if ‖∆i‖ = 0 then . a local optimum is found
7: return A˜i
8: end if
9: if Bi + ||ηi∆i||2 ≤  then . one-step look ahead
10: A˜i+1 = A˜i + ηi∆i, Bi+1 = Bi + ‖ηi∆i‖2, i = i+ 1
11: else
12: return A˜i
13: end if
14: end while
The first key step of Algorithm 1 is line 4, where we compute the gradient of the principal’s utility
function with respect to A˜. This gradient involves terms that do not have an explicit functional
form in terms of the decision variable, and we deal with each of these in turn.
First, consider the gradient of the normalized cut φ(S) w.r.t. A˜. Let xS be the characteristic
vector of S, that is xS [i] = 1 iff i ∈ S. Let D˜ be the diagonal degree matrix D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij ,
and let L˜ = A˜− D˜ be the Laplacian matrix. Using D˜ and L˜ to express vol(S) and cut(S,S ′),
respectively, we have:
φ(S) = x>S L˜xS
(
1
x>S D˜xS
+
1
x>S′D˜xS′
)
. (7)
It is clear that Eq. (7) is a differentiable function of A˜. Computing its gradient ∇A˜φ(S) can then
be handled by automatic differentiation tools such as PyTorch [26].
Next, we compute the gradient of λ1(A˜S) w.r.t. A˜. A standard way to compute λ1(A˜S) is
by using SVD. However, this is both prohibitively expensive (O(n3)), and does not provide us
with the necessary gradient information. Instead, we use the power method [11] to compute
λ1(A˜S). Let vS be the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue λ1(A˜S). Using Rayleigh
quotients [34], we can compute λ1(A˜S) as follows:
vS = argmax
‖x‖2=1
x>A˜Sx (8a)
λ1(A˜S) = v>S A˜SvS . (8b)
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vS ← power method(A˜S)
λ1(A˜S) = v>S A˜SvS
PyTorch
A˜ λ1(A˜S)
∇A˜λ1(A˜S)
Figure 1: Computing λ1(A˜S) given A˜, which defines a differentiable function relation between
λ1(A˜S) and A˜.
Thus, when vS is known, the computation of λ1(A˜S) reduces to matrix multiplications. In
addition, A˜S is usually sparse, so we can leverage sparse matrix multiplication to speed up the
computation.
The remaining challenge is that vS is an optimal solution of an optimization problem, and we need
an explicit derivative of it. Fortunately, our problem has a special structure that we exploit to
obtain an approximation of the derivative of vS . From our experiments we find that G˜S is nearly
always connected. This means that the largest eigenvalue of A˜S is simple. In addition, due to the
Perron–Frobenius theorem, the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue is strictly greater than
the absolute values of others, i.e., |λ1(A˜S)| > |λk(A˜S)| for all k 6= 1. Under these conditions, we
can use the power method to estimate vS by repeating the formula: v˜
(t+1)
S = A˜S v˜
(t)
S /‖A˜S v˜(t)S ‖2.
The `2-norm distance between v˜kS and vS decreases in a rate O(ρ
k) [11], where ρ < 1. In our
experiments we found k = 50 is enough to give a high-quality estimation for a graph with
986 nodes. Intuitively, we are using a sequence of differentiable operations to approximate the
argmax operation. Therefore the computation of ∇A˜λ1(A˜S) can be handled by PyTorch (see
Figure 1).
We use the same machinery to compute ∇A˜σ(S). First, we write σ(S) in matrix notation:
σ(S) = v>xS , (9)
where v is the unit eigenvector associated with λ1(A˜). Then we apply the power method to
compute v. Finally, σ(S) is just a linear function of v. All of these operations are differentiable,
and the computation of ∇A˜σ(S) is handled by PyTorch.
The next issue addressed by the algorithm is the challenge imposed by the constraints involving
preservation of the graph spectrum, which can result in a computationally challenging projection
step which can also significantly harm solution quality. We address this challenge as follows.
Given a real symmetric matrix X, let ‖X‖2 denote its spectral norm. To satisfy Eq. (5), we use
the following result from pseudospectrum theory (see [35], Theorem 2.2):
∣∣λi(A˜)− λi(A)∣∣ ≤ , i = 1, . . . , n ⇐⇒ ‖A˜−A‖2 ≤  (10)
Since ∆ = A˜−A is a real symmetric matrix, we have ‖∆‖2 = max{|λ1(∆)||λn(∆)|}. In addition,
the eigen-decomposition of ∆ indicates that −λn(∆) = λ1(−∆), which leads to:
A˜ satisfies Eq. (5) ⇐⇒ max{|λ1(∆)|, |λ1(−∆)|} ≤ . (11)
This equivalence allows the principal to check whether she is within budget simply by evaluating
max{|λ1(∆)|, |λ1(−∆)|}, i.e., computing the largest eigenvalue of a real symmetric matrix, which
can be computed efficiently using, e.g., the power method [11].
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Our algorithm leverages this connection as follows. Line 9 in Algorithm 1 is a one step look-ahead,
which ensures that the perturbation ∆i is only added to A˜i when there is enough budget. Recall
from Section 2.2 that ‖∆i‖2 = max{|λ1(∆i)|, |λ1(−∆i)|}. Thus this step requires us to compute
λ1(∆i) and λ1(−∆i), using again the power method. Line 10 tracks the amount of budget used
so far. We now show that the output of Algorithm 1 always returns a feasible solution. Suppose
Algorithm 1 terminates after k > 1 iterations. This means Bk + ‖ηk∆k‖2 >  and Bk ≤ . In
other words Bk =
∑k−1
i=1 ‖ηi∆i‖2 ≤ . Note that the total amount of perturbation added to A is
∆ =
∑k−1
i=1 ηi∆i. The triangle inequality implies ‖∆‖2 ≤ .
For each iteration of Algorithm 1, the most expensive part comes from the power method and
matrix multiplications. Let m be the number of nonzeros in A˜i; if the graph is unweighted then m
is the number of edges at this iteration. By leveraging the sparseness exhibited in A˜i, the power
method runs in O(m) and the matrix multiplications cost O(mn). Thus, the time complexity of
each iteration is O(mn).
Recall that our model for targeted diffusion is applicable to both weighted and unweighted graphs.
For weighted graphs, the principal modifies the weights on existing edges. For unweighted graphs,
the principal adds new edges or deletes existing edges from the graph. The main difference
between the two settings is that the latter needs a rounding heuristic to convert a matrix with
fractional entries to a binary adjacency matrix. We discuss this heuristic below.
After running Algorithm 1, we obtain a perturbed matrix A˜ with fractional entries. For unweighted
graphs, a rounding heuristic is needed to convert A˜ to a valid adjacency matrix. Let D =
{(i, j)|A˜i,j 6= Ai,j} be the set of candidate edges that will be added or deleted from G. For each
edge (i, j) ∈ D define the score s(i,j) = |A˜i,j −Ai,j |. Intuitively, s(i,j) indicates the impact that
adding or deleting the edge has on the principal’s utility. Next, we iteratively modify G, by
adding or deleting edges in D, starting with the one with the largest s(i,j). The modification
process stops when the budget is exhausted, which results in the desired binary adjacency matrix.
For weighted graphs, let C = maxi,j Aij and normalize each entry by C, that is Aij/C. We run
Algorithm 1 on the normalized adjacency matrix, which results in A˜. The desired adjacency
matrix is obtained by multiplying each A˜ij by C, CA˜ij . If integer weights are desired, a final
rounding step is applied. Our experimental results show that the rounding heuristic is effective in
practice.
4 Certified Robustness
This section addresses the following question: what are the limits on the principal’s ability to
successfully accomplish her attack? More precisely, we now seek to identify necessary conditions
on the attack budget  so the attack succeeds; conversely, we can view a given graph to be certified
to be robust to attacks that use a smaller budget than the one required.
Let TargetDiff(S, G, ) be an instance of the targeted diffusion problem with targeted subset S,
underlying graph G and budget . An instance TargetDiff(S, G, ) can be successfully attacked
if the principal is able to modify G into G˜ (within budget ) such that I(G˜S)− I(GS) > 0. Next
we derive a necessary condition for successful targeted attacks, in the form of a lower bound on
.
In order to derive the necessary condition on , we make use of our experimental observation
that in successful attacks the degrees of nodes in the targeted subgraph GS always increase.
This aligns well with intuition: a denser subgraph GS will tend to increase the propensity of the
diffusion (e.g., of malware or treatment) to spread within it, which is one of our explicit objectives.
Let di (resp. d˜i) be the degree of node i before (resp. after) graph modification. We assume if an
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attack is successful, the degrees of nodes in GS are increased, i.e., d˜i ≥ di for i ∈ S.
Now, observe that computing the exact value of I(GS) is intractable, since the exact computation
of pii is prohibitive (see, e.g., [36], Section IV.B). Van Mieghem et al. [36] proposed a simple
yet effective estimator for pii to be 1− δ/(βdi). The estimator works in the regime δ/β ≤ dmin,
where dmin is the minimum degree of G. Consequently, an estimator for I(GS) is Iˆ(GS) =∑
i∈S 1− δ/(βdi). We focus on the setting where the estimation error is bounded by a small
number, i.e., |Iˆ(GS)− I(GS)| ≤ τ . Note that τ can be estimated from historical diffusion data.
The formal statement of the necessary condition is in Theorem 1. Due to space limitation the
proof is deferred to Appendix 3.
Theorem 1. Given an instance TargetDiff(S, G, ), I(GS) is estimated by Iˆ(GS) =
∑
i∈S 1− δ/(βdi).
Suppose the estimation error is bounded by τ , i.e., |Iˆ(GS)− I(GS)| ≤ τ , the degrees of nodes in
S are increased, i.e., d˜i ≥ di for i ∈ S, and δ/β ≤ dmin. In order to have I(G˜S)− I(GS) > 2τ ,
the budget  must satisfy:
 ≥
√
|S|
n
(∑
i∈S d
2
i
|S| −
(∑
i∈S di
)2
|S|2
)1/2
. (12)
The quantity inside the square root is always nonnegative due to Jensen’s inequality. The lower
bound involves only structural properties of the graph (node degrees and the size of S) and thus
can be easily computed given an arbitrary graph. As mentioned above, we can view this lower as
a robustness certificate, or guarantee for the given graph. It guarantees, in particular, that when
the budget is below the lower bound, the total probability of “infection” (e.g., malware infection)
in GS cannot be increased by more than 2τ . In the special case of perfect estimation (τ = 0), it
implies impossibility of increasing the susceptibility of GS to targeted diffusion.
The proof of Theorem 1 does not depend on the specific objective function proposed in this paper.
Consequently, the certificate is not specific to our particular objective function. Further, the lower
bound is independent of the parameters of the diffusion, i.e., the values of δ and β, as long as
δ/β ≤ dmin. In other words, it applies to both highly infectious (small δ/β) and slow-spreading
(large δ/β) diffusion.
We briefly discuss the settings where the robustness guarantee is most applicable. First, the
estimation for the infected ratio on GS is accurate, i.e., |Iˆ(GS) − I(GS)| ≤ τ and τ is small.
According to Van Mieghem et al. [36], this usually happens on graphs with small degree variation.
Another setting is where the degrees of nodes in GS increase as a result of the attack, which is
both natural and empirically founded, as we mentioned earlier. Experimental results on synthetic
networks to verify the robustness guarantee are presented in Appendix 6.
5 Experiments and Discussion
This section presents experimental results on three real-world datasets: an email network, an
airport network, and a brain network. Additional results on synthetic networks can be found in
Appendix 4.
For each network we run four experiments which differ in the hyper-parameters (α1, α2, α3),
corresponding to the four columns of Figure 2. The first uses α1 = α2 = α3 = 1/3, which encodes
that the principal’s objectives are equally important. This is to show the overall effectiveness of our
approach. The other three experiments are designed to show the effectiveness of each term in the
principal’s objective function. For example, in the second experiment, we use hyper-parameters
α1 = 1/3, α2 = 0, and α3 = 1/3 (the hyper-parameters do not need to sum to one). To study
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how the principal’s effectiveness changes with respect to her budget, we define a parameter γ
that ranges from 10% to 50%. The budget is then set to  = γλ1(A). A single initially infected
node is selected uniformly at random.
Recall that we use G and G˜ to denote the original and the modified graphs, respectively. We
simulate the spreading dynamics 2000 times on both G and G˜. For unweighted graphs the
recovery rate δ and transmission rate β are set to 0.24 and 0.06, respectively, while for weighted
graphs δ = 0.24 and β = 0.2. Additional experimental results for other values of δ and β are in
Appendix 5. The spreading dynamics converges exponentially fast to the steady state: empirically,
we found 30 time steps to be enough to reach the steady state in most cases.4 When the simulation
finishes, we extract the number of nodes that are “infected”. We use Ioriginal and Imodified to
represent the fractions of infected nodes on G and G˜, respectively.
Unweighted Graphs: We consider an email network [18]. The largest connected component
of the network is extracted as G, which has 986 nodes. An edge (i, j) indicates that there were
email exchanges between nodes i and j. This data set contains ground-truth labels to indicate
which community a node belongs to. We uniformly at random pick a community with 15 nodes
as S.
The experimental results for the email network are at the top row of Figure 2. The overall
effectiveness of our approach is shown in the first column. The difference of the impact on the
modified and original graphs, that is Imodified − Ioriginal, is shown for GS (blue line) and GS′
(orange line), respectively. As γ gets larger, the impact on GS (blue line) increases, while the
impact on GS′ (orange line) is under control, which demonstrates that the proposed approach is
highly effective at both increasing the impact of diffusion on the targeted subgraph, and at the
same time preventing the impact on the remaining graph.
The second column is to show that maximizing λ1(A˜S) leads to higher infected ratios. The
labels of the y-axis become ISmodified − ISoriginal, which highlights that the infected ratios are for
the targeted subgraph GS (the higher the better). Note that α2 is set to zero in order to avoid
the coupling between the eigenvector centrality of S and λ1(A˜S). From the plot it is clear that
maximizing λ1(A˜S) is important to increase the infected ratios within GS (the blue line). Note
that solely maximizing the normalized cut of S may backfire (the red line), as a large portion of
edges are deleted from GS when γ increases.
The third column is to show the effectiveness of limiting the impact on GS′ by maximizing the
eigenvector centrality of S. The y-axis represents IS′modified − IS
′
original, which highlights that the
infected ratios are for the non-targeted subgraph GS′ (the lower the better). The plot shows that
the impact on GS′ is well limited; the effectiveness is most significant when γ > 40%.
The last column is to show the effectiveness of maximizing the normalized cut of S. We set
α2 = 0 to avoid the effect of maximizing the eigenvector centrality of S. Observe that maximizing
the normalized cut of S is effective in increasing the infected ratio within GS .
4The SIS model is similar to an irreducible (G and G˜ are connected) and aperiodic (each infected node recovers
with probability δ) Markov chain representing a lazy random walk on the network.
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Figure 2: Experiments to show the effectiveness of the model. Top: the email network; Middle:
the airport network; Bottom: the brain network. The first column shows the overall effectiveness
of the model. The remaining three columns (from left to right) show the effectiveness of: 1)
maximizing λ1(A˜S); 2) Maximizing the eigenvector centrality of S; 3) maximizing the normalized
cut of S.
Weighted Graphs: We consider an airport network and a brain network. The airport net-
work [24] was collected from the website of Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the U.S., where
the nodes represent all of the 1572 airports in the U.S. and the weights on edges encode the
number of passengers traveled between two airports in 2010. We scaled the weights on the airport
network to [0, 1]. The targeted set S was chosen by first sampling a node i uniformly at random,
and then setting S to be i and all its neighbors. We report experimental results for an S with 60
nodes. The brain network [8] consists of 638 nodes where each node corresponds to a region in
human brain. An edge between nodes i and j indicates that the two regions have co-activated on
some tasks. The weight on the edge quantifies the strength of the co-activation estimated by the
Jaccard index. The weights on edges lie in [0, 1]. The 638 regions are categorized into four areas:
default mode, visual, fronto-parietal, and central. Each area is responsible for some functionality
of human. We select 100 nodes from the central area as the targeted set S.
The results for the airport (resp. brain) network are at the middle (resp. bottom) row of Figure 2.
The overall trend is similar to that of the email network, except that maximizing the normalized
cut of S is not effective in increasing the infected ratio within GS . This suggests that on weighted
graphs normalized cut might not be a good heuristic to increase the centrality of S.
Final Word: Our experiments show that our model and optimization algorithm are effective
in implementing targeted diffusions on real-world graphs. The algorithm leverages Rayleigh
quotients and pseudospectrum theory, which is scalable to large graphs. We also derived a
necessary condition to certify whether a network is robust against a broad class of targeted
diffusion.
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Appendix
1 Generalization to Other Diffusion Dynamics
In this section we discuss generalization of the targeted diffusion model, i.e., Eq. (6), to other
common diffusion dynamics. The fundamental question is: does the heuristic encoded by the
model apply to other scenarios with different diffusion dynamics (e.g., SIR or SEIR)?
First, the feasible region of the model is independent of the diffusion dynamics, as it is only related
to the spectral properties of the underlying graph. Thus, the structural (i.e., spectra, degree
sequence, and triangle distribution) preserving properties of the diffusion model generalize to other
diffusion dynamics. Next, recall that the objective function of the model is the following
α1λ1(A˜S) + α2σ(S) + α3φ(S).
The third term is the normalized cut, which only depends on structural properties of the underlying
graph, so it generalizes to any other diffusion dynamics. The first term also generalizes to many
common diffusion dynamics, including SIR and SEIR, as their epidemic thresholds are known to
also be determined by the largest eigenvalue of the underlying adjacency matrix [27]. The only
exception is the second term σ(S), that is, limiting the impact on non-targeted subset through
maximizing the eigencentrality of the targeted subset. This is because the rationale of maximizing
σ(S) depends on the steady state of the diffusion dynamics. Here, the steady state is where in the
long run a constant (in average) fraction of infected nodes exist. However, both SIR and SEIR
have been shown without a steady state, as in the long run all nodes will be in the recovered
state (i.e., immune to the diffusion) [25].
Finally, the certified robustness in Section 4 generalizes to other diffusion dynamics, as its proof
only depends on the spectral properties of the underlying graph.
2 Degree Sequence and Triangle
We now show that satisfying the restrictions Eq (5) implies that certain structural properties of
the graph will be perturbed by only a small amount.
Indeed, the principal’s action has mild impact on the degree sequence of G. Let d = A1 be the
vector whose i-th entry is the degree of the i-th node in the original graph, and similarly, let
d˜ = A˜1 be the degree sequence after the perturbation.
Proposition 2. The degree sequence of G before and after the perturbation satisfies:
‖d˜− d‖2 ≤
√
n. (13)
Proof.
‖d˜− d‖2 = ‖A˜1−A1‖2
(a)
= ‖∆1‖2 = ‖∆(1/
√
n)1
√
n‖2
≤ √n max
‖x‖=1
‖∆x‖2
(b)
=
√
n‖∆‖2
≤ √n,
(14)
where (a) is due to the fact that A˜ − A = ∆, and (b) comes from the definition of spectral
norm.
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A direct corollary of Proposition 2 concerns the average degree of G.
Corollary 3. The average degree of G after the perturbation is within  of the average degree
before the perturbation: ∣∣∣davg(G; A˜)− davg(G;A)∣∣∣ ≤ . (15)
Proof. Note that davg(G˜) = 1
>d˜
n and davg(G) =
1>d
n . Thus we have:∣∣∣1>d˜/n− 1>d/n∣∣∣ = (1/n) ∣∣∣1>(d˜− d)∣∣∣
≤ (1/n)‖1‖2 · ‖d˜− d‖2
= .
(16)
Next, we perform a similar analysis for the number of triangles before and after the perturba-
tion.
Proposition 4. Assume G is unweighted with m edges and T triangles. Suppose the number of
triangles after the perturbation is T˜ . Then we have
|T − T˜ | ≤ m, (17)
where the estimate is correct up to a first order approximation.
Proof. Since G is unweighted, we have T = Tr
(
A3
)
/6, where Tr is the trace operator. The
restrictions Eq. (5) guarantee that we can write λi(A˜) = λi (A) + ηi, where ηi ∈ [−1, 1]. Thus,
6T˜ =
n∑
i
λi(A˜
3) =
n∑
i
λi(A˜)
3 =
n∑
i
(λi(A) + ηi)
3 . (18)
Expanding the cube and neglecting the terms of higher order in ηi, we have
6T˜ ≈
n∑
i
λi(A)
3 + 3
n∑
i
λi(A)
2ηi = 6T + 3
n∑
i
λi(A)
2ηi. (19)
And thus
2|T˜ − T | ≈ 
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i
λi(A)
2ηi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
n∑
i
∣∣λi(A)2ηi∣∣ ≤  n∑
i
λi(A)
2 = Tr(A2). (20)
Since A is symmetric and binary, we have Tr(A2) = 2m, where m is the number of edges in
G.
In what follows we present experimental results to show that the spectra and degree sequences do
not change a lot due to the targeted diffusion. The spectra and degree sequences of G and G˜ are
showed in Figure 3, in which the top row presents the spectra with the eigenvalues as ranked
in descending order, and the bottom row presents the degree sequences. The three columns
(from left to right) correspond to the email network, the airport network, and the brain network,
respectively. The parameter γ is set to 0.5, the most powerful principal.
The Email Network: From Figure 3 (top row), the eigenvalues with large value admit the
largest deviation, while the bottom row of that figure shows that the degree sequence is not
significantly affected by the targeted diffusion. In fact, the change to the original degree sequence
is mild, and a student’s t-test cannot differentiate the modified degree sequence from the original
one (p-value=0.081).
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The Airport and The Brain Networks: The spectra and degree sequences of G and G˜
are showed in the last two columns of Figure 3. As we can see from Figure 3 (top row), the
graph spectrum is again nearly preserved, except the eigenvalues with small values admit some
deviation. Similarly, the modified degree sequences cannot be differentiated from the original one
by student’s t-tests (airport: p-value=0.4969, brain: p-value=0.9919).
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Figure 3: Spectra (top) and degree sequences (bottom) for the left: the email network; middle:
the airport network; and right: the brain network. The hyper-parameters are set to α1 = α2 =
α3 = 1/3.
3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. From the discussion in the main paper, an instance TargetDiff(S, G, ) can be encoded
by the following meta model:
max
A˜
I(G˜S)− I(GS)
s.t. A˜ ∈ P.
(21)
As discussed in [36] (see Section IV.B), computing the exact value of I(GS) is intractable, since
the exact computation of pii is challenging. Our model Eq. (6) can be thought of as a tractable
proxy to the meta model. An estimation to I(GS) is given in [36], i.e., Iˆ(GS) =
∑
i∈S 1− δ/(βdi),
where di is the degree of node i in G. The estimator works in the region δ/β ≤ dmin, where dmin is
the minimum degree of G. When the estimation is reasonably good, that is |Iˆ(GS)− I(GS)| ≤ τ ,
we have the following relation:
I(G˜S)− I(GS) > 2τ =⇒ (Iˆ(G˜S) + τ)− (Iˆ(GS)− τ) > 2τ =⇒ Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) > 0.
Thus, in what follows we focus on deriving the necessary condition for Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) > 0, which
directly translates to the necessary condition for I(G˜S)− I(GS) > 2τ .
Suppose there exists an adjacency matrix A˜∗ ∈ P such that I(G˜S)− I(GS) > 2τ . This indicates
that the corresponding instance TargetDiff(S, G, ) is successful. Consequently, it follows that
Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) > 0. Recall that Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) = δβ
∑
i∈S (
1
di
− 1
d˜i
). Let d˜S ∈ R|S| represent the
degree sequence of nodes in S. Due to Proposition 2 we have ‖d˜S − dS‖22 ≤ ‖d˜ − d‖22 ≤ n2.
Consider the optimization problem in Eq. (22), where the objective function is Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) (up
to a multiplicative factor). The last constraint follows from the assumption that for a successful
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instance the degrees of nodes in S increase. The fact that Iˆ(G˜S)− Iˆ(GS) > 0 implies that the
optimal solution of Eq. (22) exists and the associated objective value is greater than zero.
max
d˜S
∑
i∈S
(
1
di
− 1
d˜i
)
s.t. ‖d˜S − dS‖22 ≤ n2
d˜S  dS .
(22)
Denote the feasible region of the above optimization problem asM. Note thatM is a convex set
since it is the intersection of two convex sets.
The objective function is concave in d˜S , since it is twice differentiable on the feasible regionM
and the Hessian matrix is negative definite; the Hessian matrix is a diagonal matrix with the
i-th diagonal element being −2/d˜3i . Thus, Eq. (22) is a convex optimization problem. Note that
the Slater’s condition is satisfied (e.g., with d˜S = dS), which indicates that strong duality holds.
Thus, the KKT conditions are satisfied at any primal and dual optimal solutions.
For convenience, in what follows we use di (resp. d˜i) to represent the degree of a node i ∈ S
before (resp. after) graph modification. The Lagrange function of Eq. (22) is:
L(d˜S , λ,β) =
∑
i∈S
(
1
di
− 1
d˜i
)
+ λ
(
n2 − ‖d˜S − dS‖22
)
+ β>
(
d˜S − dS
)
,
where λ ≥ 0 and β  0 are Lagrangian multipliers. Recall that the degrees of nodes in S are
increased, i.e., d˜i ≥ di for all i ∈ S. Note that for a node i ∈ S such that d˜i = di, we let the
corresponding βi = 0. Thus, by complementary slackness, we have βi = 0 for all i ∈ S. The
gradient of L(d˜S , λ,β) w.r.t. d˜i becomes:
∂L
∂d˜i
=
1
d˜2i
− 2λd˜i + βi = 1
d˜2i
− 2λd˜i.
Setting the gradient to zero leads to:
d˜i =
(
1
2λ
)1/3
,∀i ∈ S.
Since the optimal solution exists, we have λ 6= 0. By complementary slackness we have
λ
(
n2 − ‖d˜S − dS‖22
)
= 0, which indicates:
n2 = ‖d˜S − dS‖22.
Expand the above equation:
n2 = ‖d˜S − dS‖22 (23)
=
∑
i∈S
(
d˜i − di
)2
(24)
=
∑
i∈S
((
1
2λ
)1/3
− di
)2
. (25)
Substitute
(
1
2λ
)1/3 with a variable x and re-arrange the above equation:
x2 − 2
∑
i∈S di
|S| x+
∑
i∈S d
2
i − n2
|S| = 0.
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According to vieta theorem, a necessary condition that we can solve for x ∈ R from the above
equation is: (
2
∑
i∈S di
|S|
)2
− 4
(∑
i∈S d
2
i − n2
|S|
)
≥ 0,
which leads to:
 ≥
√
|S|
n
(∑
i∈S d
2
i
|S| −
(∑
i∈S di
)2
|S|2
)1/2
.
4 Additional Results on Synthetic Networks
In this section we show experimental results on synthetic unweighted graphs with 375 nodes. We
focus on three classes of networks: Barabasi-Albert (BA), Small-World, and BTER [30]. BA is
characterized by its power-law degree distribution [4]. Small-World is well-known for its local
clustering in a way as to qualitatively resemble real networks [40]. BTER are generative network
models that can be calibrated to match real-world networks, in particular, to reproduce the
community structures [30].
The experimental setup is similar to the setup for the email network, except for a few changes.
First, the experimental results for each class of the synthetic networks are averaged over 30
randomly generated network topologies. Another difference lies in how the targeted set S is
selected. For each randomly generated network, the targeted set S is selected as the node
whose degree is the 90 percentile of the degree sequence, and its neighbors. Some statistics of
the synthetic networks are summarized in Table 1. Recall that δ = 0.24 and β = 0.06. The
experimental results are showed in Figure 4. The conclusion derived from Figure 4 is similar to
that of the email network. It is worth pointing out that maximizing the normalized cut of S is
effective on BA networks, while for other network it may backfire.
BA Small-World BTER
|S| 17.5 12 20.03
dmin 9.86 10 11.69
density 0.02 0.03 0.03
average degree 9.87 10 11.5
average clustering coeff. 0.08 0.35 0.05
Table 1: Statistics of synthetic networks.
5 Additional Results for Different Values of δ and β
In the main paper, δ = 0.24 and β = 0.2 for the airport and brain networks, while δ = 0.24 and
β = 0.06 for the email network. The ratio δ/β is 1.2 for the former two networks, while 4 for the
latter. In what follows we explore the effectiveness of our model in different regimes of δ/β. For
the airport and brain networks, we present results for (δ = 0.5, β = 0.1) and (δ = 0.3, β = 0.5).
The former (resp. latter) corresponds to the regime above (resp. below) 1.2. The results for the
airport network are showed in Figure 5, and the results for the brain network are in Figure 6.
For the email network we present results for (δ = 0.5, β = 0.1) and (δ = 0.3, β = 0.5), also
corresponds to the regime above and below the original ratio respectively. The results are showed
in Figure 7. The conclusions are consistent with that presented in the main paper.
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Figure 4: Experimental results on synthetic networks. The first column shows the overall
effectiveness of the threat model. Remaining columns show the effectiveness of: 1) maximizing
λ1(A˜S); 2) Maximizing the eigenvector centrality of S; 3) maximizing the normalized cut of S.
Top: BA; Middle: Small-World; Bottom: BTER
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Figure 5: Experimental results for different δ and β values on the airport network. Top:
δ = 0.5, β = 0.1; Bottom: δ = 0.3, β = 0.5.
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Figure 6: Experimental results for different δ and β values on the brain network. Top: δ =
0.5, β = 0.1; Bottom: δ = 0.3, β = 0.5.
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Figure 7: Experimental results for different δ and β values on the email network. Top: δ =
0.5, β = 0.1; Bottom: δ = 0.3, β = 0.5.
6 Experimental Results for the Certified Robustness
We run several experiments on synthetic networks to verify the certified robustness. The
experimental setup is basically the same as that in Appendix 4, except that we explore a wider
range of values for budget . The minimum degree dmin for each class of network is listed in
Table 1. Recall that the parameters of diffusion are δ = 0.24 and β = 0.06; the condition
δ/β ≤ dmin is satisfied. The results are showed in Fig. 8. The blue lines represent the difference
I(G˜S)− I(GS). As we mentioned before, the objective of targeted diffusion is to maximize the
difference. Note that here I(G˜S) and I(GS) are estimated from actual simulations. The x-axis
is the budget , which ranges from 0.01λ1(A) to 0.5λ1(A). The red vertical lines are the lower
bounds of  computed from Eq. (12) in Theorem 1. Observe that when  is less than the lower
bound (the left of the red line), the difference I(G˜S)− I(GS) is close to zero, which indicates that
the network is robust against targeted diffusion, i.e., the principal cannot significantly increase
I(GS) through graph modification.
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Figure 8: Experimental results for the certified robustness. Left: BA, Middle: Small-World,
Right: BTER.
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